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The Ontological Turn Misunderstood: 




here has been an “ontological turn”’, states Fraser MacBride at the 
beginning of his article ‘Could Armstrong Have Been a Universal?’ 
(1999). He is referring to the fact that even in circles where there once has 
been a ‘linguistic turn’, or where metaphysical problems have been treated 
as problems of semantics, now again metaphysical theories of things and 
properties are developed. (For a survey of such theories see Oliver 1996.) 
Such theories are used in philosophical analyses of, e.g., causation or 
modality. MacBride argues that these analyses, and in particular 
Armstrong’s theory of possibility, are ‘flawed’: ‘The concepts of particular 
and universal such analyses presuppose are not properly understood. The 
ontological turn has proceeded hastily without the required proper 
examination of these concepts’ (MacBride 1999, p. 471). I shall argue that 
MacBride has proceeded hastily without the required proper examination 
of these metaphysical theories. Discussing MacBride’s misunderstanding 
of Armstrong I shall suggest that there is a greater gulf between semantics 
and metaphysics than many think.  
MacBride’s aim is to show that theories of modality such as David 
Armstrong’s, which are supposed to be reductionist, fail to be reductionist 
because the concepts of particular and universal which they employ are 
‘suffused with modality’ (472). Let me first explain how MacBride 
understands Armstrong’s theory, how he criticizes it, and how he 
misunderstands it. Then I shall discuss the relationship between 
metaphysics and semantics and show how MacBride’s misunderstanding 
results from a confusion of the two. MacBride’s criticism is supposed to be 
‘a fully general critique’ (p. 474) of a whole family of theories, but I shall 
concentrate on MacBride’s criticism of Armstrong’s theory of possibility.  
 
1. MacBride’s description of reductionist theories of modality 
 
MacBride takes Armstrong’s theory of modality to run as follows. There 




actual entities. There are no real possible worlds, although representations 
of possible worlds can be admitted as ‘possible worlds surrogates’. They 
‘depict worlds that combine existing particulars and universals in different 
ways’ (MacBride 1999, p. 475). Or one can say that possible worlds ‘exist 
according to a fiction in which genuinely existent particulars and 
universals are recombined to form novel instantiations’ (MacBride 1999, p. 
475). For example, if in the actual world the properties F, G, and H are 
instantiated but nothing instantiates all three, then there is another possible 
world in which a particular instantiates all three.  
According to MacBride, Armstrong’s theory then proceeds as 
follows: Modal sentences are ‘translated into a language where, roughly, 
necessity is expressed by universal quantification over possible worlds, 
possibility by existential quantification’ (MacBride 1999, pp. 476f). Now 
‘a semantics is provided for the possible worlds language by treating its 
quantifiers as ranging over possible worlds surrogates’ (p. 476). So 
MacBride takes the aim of Armstrong’s theory to be to provide in this way 
‘truth conditions’ for modal sentences. He takes the aim of Armstrong’s 
theory to be to translate modal sentences into possible worlds language, to 
say they are true if and only if the possible worlds are so-and-so, and to say 
what possible worlds are. Assume, for example, in the actual world there is 
a particular b which instantiates the property N and not the property F, 
which is instantiated by other particulars. Take the sentence S ‘b could 
have been F instead of N’. According to MacBride, Armstrong’s theory 
translates S into S* ‘There is a possible world in which b is F but not N’. 
Further, the theory states that S*, and hence S, is true if and only if there is 
a fiction of a certain kind according to which b is F instead of N.  
Now we come to the bit which is most important for MacBride’s 
criticism. Armstrong calls his theory of modality ‘reductionist’. MacBride 
spells this out as follows.  
 
[A] modal reduction must, on any account, be capable of specifying non-modal 
truth conditions for sentences that contain modal vocabulary. […] This means that 
a reductive theory of modality must satisfy (in principle) the following two 
constraints. First, the theory must be extensionally adequate (EA). Each 
specification of a truth condition that the theory associates with a modal sentence 
must be materially equivalent to the sentence for which it specifies a truth 
condition. Second, the theory must be non-circular (NC). Each specification of 
the truth condition of a modal sentence that the theory provides must be expressed 
(perhaps at infinite length) using only non-modal vocabulary. (MacBride 1999, 




So, according to MacBride, Armstrong’s theory aims to provide ‘non-
modal truth conditions’ for modal sentences, that is, it aims to transform 
sentences that express modal claims or that contain modal vocabulary into 
sentences that express no modal claims and that contain no modal 
vocabulary.  
 
2. MacBride’s criticism of reductionist theories of modality 
 
MacBride’s criticism is that Armstrong’s theory, contrary to what 
Armstrong claims, is not reductive. Armstrong fails because his theory 
commits him to some irreducibly modal sentences. ‘The concepts of 
particular and universal dictate that if particulars and universals exist a 
range of modal sentences are true […]. Combinatorial theories cannot be 
reductive because they cannot provide truth conditions for these sentences 
that simultaneously satisfy (EA) and (NC).’ (MacBride 1999, p. 477) So 
MacBride wants to show that there are modal sentences for which 
Armstrong fails to provide non-modal truth conditions. The truth 
conditions Armstrong provides are prima facie non-modal but they contain 
concepts which have modal ingredients.  
I think MacBride is right so far: the sentences which he puts forward 
as examples against Armstrong are (insofar as they are meaningful) 
irreducibly modal. Let me give three examples.  
 
(1) Necessarily, nothing is both 5 kg and 1 kg in mass. (p. 478)  
 
A defender of a combinatorial theory of modality could hold that, as any 
combination of properties is possible, (1) is false. This theory would be 
open to the objection that it fails to satisfy (EA). But Armstrong takes (1) 
to be true. MacBride argues that then Armstrong has to specify which 
fictive possible worlds contain only possible combinations of properties. 
This cannot be done without the use of modal vocabulary. Hence 
Armstrong has to admit that there are true modal sentences which are 
either themselves irreducibly modal or for which he cannot provide truth 
conditions without the use of modal vocabulary. Hence Armstrong’s theory 
does not satisfy (NC).  
Further, MacBride explains that Armstrong is committed to certain 
modal principles about particulars and universals and that hence again 
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(NC) is violated. For example, Armstrong rejects the possibility of non-
instantiated universals. So he is committed to  
 
(2) Every universal is necessarily instantiated. (p. 485)  
 
But no totally non-modal truth conditions for (2) are given. So 
Armstrong’s theory violates (NC). Another example is: 
(3) Necessarily, particulars only instantiate universals. (p. 487) 
Armstrong takes instantiation to be a non-symmetrical relation between 
particulars and universals. So he is committed to the truth of (2). 
Armstrong does not, and cannot, provide truth conditions for (2) without 
using modal vocabulary. Hence again Armstrong’s theory violates (NC). 
MacBride is right in holding that ‘the concepts of particular and universal’ 
are ‘suffused with modality’ and that Armstrong’s theory does not satisfy 
(NC), i.e. it does not provide for every modal sentence ‘truth conditions’ 
which can be ‘expressed using only non-modal vocabulary’ (p. 474).  
 
3. Armstrong’s theory restated 
 
However, MacBride misunderstood Armstrong’s claim that his theory of 
modality is ‘reductionist’. A theory that is reductionist in Armstrong’s 
sense does not need to satisfy (NC). Let me sketch Armstrong’s theory (cf. 
Armstrong 1989 and 1997, ch. 10):  
 
There are particulars and universals. Universals, i.e. properties, are instantiated 
by particulars. If two particulars, a and b, have the same property F, then the F-
ness of a is identical with the F-ness of b. Which universals there are is not to 
be discovered a priori but only a posteriori. Universals are not the meanings of 
predicates, and there is no one-to-one correlation between predicates and 
universals. A predicate may apply in virtue of one or of several universals. 
Different predicates may apply in virtue of the same universal, and a predicate 
‘F’ may apply to a because a instantiates the universal L and to b because b 
instantiates the universal M. A particular together with a universal (or several 
universals) which it instantiates, i.e. an entity of the form a’s being G, is called 
a state of affairs. Every universal is instantiated at least once. Everything there 
is is either a state of affairs or composed of states of affairs or a constituent of a 
state of affairs.  
 
There are true statements about what is possible and about what is 
necessary, e.g. ‘Nothing can be both 1 kg and 5 kg in mass’ or ‘There 
could be a man 5 m tall’. The aim of Armstrong’s theory of modality is to 
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‘give some account of the nature of possibility’ (Armstrong 1989, p. 3), 
and to answer the question ‘What truthmakers can our ontology supply for 
modal truths?’ (Armstrong 1997, p. 149).  
Armstrong’s theory of modality is reductionist, or ‘deflationary’, in 
the sense that it entails that ‘necessary and merely possible states of affairs 
are not required. The contingent states of affairs are to provide truthmakers 
enough’ (Armstrong 1997, p. 172). Let us clarify this by stating what a 
non-reductionist view would be like. Consider the following line of 
thought. ‘Raising the arm entails that the arm goes up, but the arm’s going 
up does not entail that the arm was raised. In the same way, what is actual 
is possible, but what is possible need not be actual. As a result, just as we 
ask what must be added […] to the arm’s going up to yield raising the arm, 
so we are tempted to ask what must be added to something merely possible 
to yield its actuality.’ Giving in to this temptation leads to a non-
reductionist view, because one who asks ‘What must be added to 
something merely possible to yield its actuality?’ grants some ontological 
status to the merely possible. The non-reductionist believes ‘that there are 
two sorts of states of affairs: the actual ones and those that are merely 
possible’ (Armstrong 1997, p. 148). According to the non-reductionist 
view, the statement that there could be a man 5 m tall is made true by a 
merely possible state of affairs consisting of a particular instantiating the 
universal being 5 m in length and all the universals which something needs 
to instantiate to count as a man. The reductionist resists this temptation. He 
claims that there are only actual entities and that true modal claims are 
made true just by the actual entities.  
A slightly different line of thought which might lead a philosopher to 
a non-reductionist view springs from the principle that for each true 
statement there is a state of affairs corresponding to it, which is the object 
of the statement and which makes the statement true, and different 
statements correspond to different states of affairs. Recognising that there 
are true modal statements one is thus led to the recognition of merely 
possible states of affairs. Anyway, the creed of the reductionist is that there 
are no such things as merely possible entities. 
Here is the rest of Armstrong’s theory of modality in a nutshell: For 
any two properties (universals) that are wholly distinct, any particular can 
instantiate both of them, one of them, or none of them. Properties are 
‘compossible’. Any combination of properties, as long as they are wholly 
distinct from each other, is possible. So all the combinations of particulars 
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and properties ‘that respect the form of atomic states of affairs constitute 
the possibilities for […] states of affairs’ (Armstrong 1997, p. 160).  
Only wholly distinct properties are compossible. Two universals can 
have common parts, they can overlap. Universals which overlap cannot be 
instantiated by the same particular (at the same time). Also, a universal 
cannot be instantiated by a particular twice. (These are basic principles on 
whose defence Armstrong spends much time. See Armstrong 1989, ch. 6; 
cf. Armstrong 1997, p. 155 and p. 174.)  
Armstrong’s conception of ‘possible worlds as fictions’ is, at least in 
his more recent writings, not an essential part of his theory of modality. In 
his A World of States of Affairs (1997) they do not play the role any more 
which they played in his A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (1989). He 
now writes that his theory ‘does not go through fictional possible worlds’ 
although they may ‘be admitted as useful fictions’ (Armstrong 1997, p. 
172).  
All true modal statements are made true just by the actual contingent 
universals and particulars. No merely possible states of affairs and no 
necessary states of affairs are needed as truthmakers. Let us see for some 
examples of modal statements how this view can be upheld.  
A statement like ‘There is nothing which has just the properties F, G, 
and H, but there could be such a thing’ is true (if it is true) because F, G, 
and H exist and are wholly distinct (and hence compossible). It is made 
true by the universals F, G, and H.  
A statement like ‘Nothing can be both F and G’ is true (if it is true) 
because F and G are not wholly distinct universals. It is made true by F and 
G.  
Finally, why is it true, according to Armstrong, that ‘every universal 
is necessarily instantiated’? I think Armstrong would say that this is true 
because of the essential nature of universals. (He speaks about ‘the 
essential nature of universals’ e.g. in his 1997, p. 127.) It flows from the 
essential nature of universals that they are promiscuously repeatable, that 
they cannot exist without being instantiated, etc. We reached the bedrock 
here. And that is just what the theory wants to do: say how things are at the 
ontological bedrock.  
 
4. What is wrong with MacBride’s criticism  
 
It is of course a matter of dispute whether Armstrong’s theory is true, and 
many elements of it can be, and are, disputed. One can dispute 
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Armstrong’s ontology, one can dispute the claim that wholly distinct 
properties are always compossible, one can dispute the claim that 
properties can overlap, etc. MacBride disputes that the theory achieves its 
objectives. The trouble is that the objectives he expects the theory to 
achieve are not the objectives which the theory is designed to achieve. He 
expects the theory to provide ‘non-modal truth conditions for sentences 
that contain modal vocabulary’ (p. 474) and hence to satisfy (EA) and 
(NC). I take it that that means that the theory should explain how modal 
sentences can be translated into sentences which are materially equivalent 
to the original sentences, but which are not modal.  
Take again the example ‘Nothing can be both 1 kg and 5 kg in mass’. 
What does Armstrong’s theory have to say about this example (which 
Armstrong discusses in his 1989, ch. 6)? Can we see from this what the 
aim of Armstrong’s theory is? The theory says about this example, first, 
that it is true, and, secondly, that it is true because the universals to which 
the predicates ‘1 kg’ and ‘5 kg’ refer overlap. In general, the theory states 
that a statement of the form ‘Nothing can be both F and G (at the same 
time)’ is true if and only if the universals in virtue of which the predicates 
‘F’ and ‘G’ apply are not wholly distinct. Armstrong does not attempt to 
translate modal statements into non-modal statements. He does not attempt 
to translate anything. He does not attempt to provide what MacBride calls 
‘truth conditions’. Hence there is nothing to satisfy or violate (EA) and 
(NC). Armstrong’s theory makes a general claim about the ontic structure 
of this world and about the combinability of universals. One may argue 
that this whole project of describing the ontic structure of this world and of 
the nature of possibility is doomed to failure. But one has to recognise that 
this is Armstrong’s project.  
There is no need to argue at length, as MacBride does, that 
Armstrong is committed to irreducibly modal statements, i.e. that his 
theory violates (NC). It is clear in everything Armstrong writes that he 
thinks that there are such true statements. Otherwise he would not have to 
be worried about what their truthmakers are. The modal statements (1), (2), 
and (3) mentioned above which MacBride’s presents as counter-examples 
to Armstrong’s theory, are statements which also Armstrong would take to 
be examples of true irreducibly modal statements. MacBride’s criticism is 
misplaced because his assumption that Armstrong wants to deny that there 




5. Semantics and Metaphysics 
 
We have here an example of a misunderstanding of an interesting type. 
There are philosophers who think that semantics has an important role in 
philosophy. They not only think that semantics is an interesting field, but 
they think that many traditional philosophical problems, e.g. problems 
about modality, have to do with semantics or are to be solved by 
‘providing a semantics’. They think that much of philosophy is about 
providing ‘truth conditions’ for certain sentences.  
But there are other philosophers who do not share this enthusiasm for 
semantics. They are rather puzzled by the fact that some of their colleagues 
always ask them to specify ‘truth conditions’ for certain statements, in 
order to solve certain philosophical problems. They think that most 
traditional philosophical problems, or those problems which they think are 
philosophical and important, are not problems of semantics, because, at 
least as they understand it, semantics is concerned with meaning, and most 
philosophical problems are not about meaning. The theories they put 
forward, e.g. of causation, or of properties, or of modality, do not say much 
about semantics and truth conditions. These philosophers might make 
claims about ‘truthmakers’, but they do not see why what their colleagues 
call ‘truth conditions’ is relevant for the problem. Let us call the former 
sort of philosophers S-philosophers and the latter sort of philosophers M-
philosophers.  
Armstrong is an M-philosopher and MacBride is an S-philosopher. 
Armstrong sees it as one of his tasks in his theory of modality to provide 
truthmakers for certain sentences. MacBride, however, writes in a footnote 
about an attempt of Armstrong to provide truthmakers for a certain type of 
modal statements: ‘He [Armstrong] offers a corresponding account of their 
truth-makers […]. But a provision of truth-makers does not make for a 
specification of truth conditions.’ (1999, p. 480, note 5) So we have the S-
philosopher telling the M-philosopher ‘A provision of truthmakers does not 
make for a provision of truth conditions’, and the M-philosopher telling the 
S-philosopher ‘A provision of truth conditions does not make for a 
provision of truthmakers’.  
What is the difference between providing truth conditions and 
providing truthmakers? Truth conditions are propositions or sentences; that 
is, they are meaning entities. For example, the proposition that the stone 
has a mass of 5 kg is a meaning entity whereas the stone is not a meaning 
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entity. The proposition is true or false, whereas the stone is neither true or 
false. That truth conditions are meaning entities is also implied by what 
MacBride says about a reductive theory of modality: ‘Each specification of 
a truth condition that the theory associates with a modal sentence must be 
materially equivalent to the sentence for which it specifies a truth 
condition.’ (474) Only a meaning entity can be materially equivalent to a 
sentence. A truthmaker can be described or referred to by a meaning entity, 
but it cannot be materially equivalent to a meaning entity (except in the 
rare case where a meaning entity is a truthmaker). Also MacBride’s 
statement of the claim that a reductive theory of modality must be non-
circular makes clear that truth conditions are meaning entities: ‘Each 
specification of the truth condition of a modal sentence that the theory 
provides must be expressed […] using only non-modal vocabulary.’ (474) 
Only meaning entities can be expressed. You can express, using certain 
vocabulary, the proposition that the stone has a mass of 5 kg, but you 
cannot express a stone or a universal.  
Truthmakers, on the other hand, as Armstrong wants to provide 
them, are not propositions and not sentences, they are not meaning entities 
at all. For example, according to Armstrong, the truthmaker of the sentence 
‘The stone has a mass of 5 kg’ is a certain state of affairs, i.e. a certain 
individual instantiating certain universals. A stone, for example, is a state 
of affairs, one involving quite many universals. A truthmaker can fall on 
your foot and hurt you. No danger of that with a truth condition. The 
truthmaker of the modal sentence ‘There can be a thing that is red and 5 kg 
in mass’, according to Armstrong, are the universals in virtue of which the 
predicates ‘is red’ and ‘is 5 kg in mass’ apply. These are not the meanings 
but the objects of the predicates. For example, one of these universals is 
that in the stone which makes it behave in a gravitational field in a certain 
way.  
Therefore providing truthmakers is different from providing truth 
conditions. MacBride misses the point of Armstrong’s theory of possibility 
when he says that Armstrong’s ‘provision of truth-makers does not make 
for a specification of truth conditions.’ (1999, p. 480, note 5) This is an 
example of an S-philosopher failing to understand what the project of M-
philosophers is, and even failing to recognize that M-philosophers pursue a 
different project than S-philosophers.  
It is very difficult for the S-philosophers and the M-philosophers to 
understand each other. Some realize that there is another camp but do not 
understand what the aim and the method of those in the other camp is. 
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Some find that some of their colleagues put things in a strange way but do 
not realize that these other philosophers are pursuing a different project. I 
have argued that MacBride misunderstands Armstrong in the latter way. 
That is why MacBride refers to Armstrong’s theory as ‘the proposed 
semantics’ (p. 477), although Armstrong does not propose a semantics at 
all.  
The two projects need to be disentangled. In the linguistic turn one of 
them swallowed the other. Some will say that both projects are worthwhile 
and depend on each other. I am sceptical about this peaceful solution, but 






Armstrong says of his theory of possibility that it is ‘reductionist’. Fraser MacBride 
has argued at great length that it fails to be reductionist because for some statements it 
fails to provide non-modal truth-conditions. I argue that MacBride misunderstands 
Armstrong’s theory because its aim is not to provide truth-conditions. This illustrates 
how great a gulf there is between semantics and metaphysics, and between those 
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